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This paper uses the EU KLEMS industry growth accounting database to explore the 
determinants of the EU-US total factor productivity (TFP) growth gap which started to 
emerge in the mid-1990s. The bulk of this TFP gap is explained by a handful of market 
service industries (notably retail & wholesale; financial; and business services) and ICT-
manufacturing, whilst the EU exhibits a considerably stronger performance with respect to the 
network utilities. Our analysis of the determinants of TFP growth across countries and 
industries shows that, as found in previous analyses (e.g., Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), 
Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen (2004), Inklaar, Timmer and Van Ark (2008)), TFP 
growth appears to be driven by catching-up phenomena associated with the gradual adoption 
of new-vintage technologies. Compared with previous analyses, it appears that TFP growth is 
also significantly driven by developments taking place at the “technological frontier”, and that 
these "frontier" effects are becoming stronger since the mid-1990's compared with the 
catching-up drivers of TFP. Industries with higher R&D expenditure and higher adoption 
rates for ICT-intensive technologies appear to exhibit higher TFP growth rates, other things 
being equal. R&D in particular is a crucial determinant of TFP growth in ICT-producing 
manufacturing. Anti-competitive financial market regulations hamper the ability of countries 
to share in the TFP developments taking place at the frontier. Product market regulations also 
appear to be related to reduced TFP growth but only in market services, notably in the 
network utilities. In the retail & wholesale trade industry, cyclical consumption dynamics 
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  11. Introductory Remarks 
 
The present paper examines the EU's productivity performance relative to the US over recent 
decades. One of the key aims of the paper is to examine the role played by total factor 
productivity (TFP) in explaining the productivity patterns which have emerged, since TFP is 
the main driver of long run productivity growth. An important feature of the analysis is the 
exploitation of the EU KLEMS industry level database to help identify those policy areas 
which could potentially have the greatest impact in narrowing the existing TFP gaps.   
 
This issue of TFP divergences must also be seen in the wider context of Europe’s overall 
growth performance since the mid-1990’s which has been relatively disappointing. Whilst 
many EU countries managed to improve their labour market positions, this unfortunately was 
accompanied by a slowdown on the productivity side in a significant number of Member 
States, driven both by a deterioration in capital deepening as well as in TFP. This experience 
was in sharp contrast to many other developed economies around the world, in particular the 
US. For the US, the secular downward movement in productivity growth rates experienced 
since the 1970's was spectacularly reversed around the mid-1990's, aided by a strong 
performance in both the production and diffusion of information and communication 
technologies (ICT).  
 
These growing divergences in the productivity performances of many developed world 
economies, and especially the size of the divergences presently being experienced between 
some of the EU's Member States, has provoked an ongoing debate in the EU regarding the 
implications of recent trends for future economic prospects : 
 
•  The “pessimistic view”, largely supported by the Sapir report
1 / van Ark analyses
2, 
suggests that the EU might be unable to achieve a shift in its resources to sectors with 
high productivity growth prospects and will continue with production in areas where it 
has traditionally held a global comparative advantage, namely medium-technology 
manufacturing industries. This overall strategy appears increasingly threatened with 
firstly, the emergence of a number of strong competitors around the world in these 
manufacturing industries (most notably from China and India) and secondly, the 
potentially negative impact on Europe's ability to compete in the, increasingly more 
tradeable, global services market.  
 
•  The “more optimistic view”, as enunciated by Blanchard amongst others
3, is that part 
of the explanation for Europe’s poor productivity performance could be measurement 
problems / adjustment lags, with perhaps the basis for a future pick-up already firmly 
established due to the labour, capital and product market reforms which have been 
progressively introduced since the early 1990's. Under this view the EU may now 
simply be in a transition phase whereby some of the negative effects of those reforms 
(e.g. a temporary decrease in productivity due to labour market changes) are visible, 
whilst the gains to be reaped in the future are not.  
 
                                                 
1 See Sapir et al. (2003) 
 
2 See Van Ark, Inklaar and Mc Guckian (2003) 
 
3 See Blanchard (2004) 
  2Most observers, "optimists" and "pessimists" alike, would agree that regulation-induced 
restrictions concerning labour and product markets; lack of openness to trade and/or foreign 
direct investments; as well as barriers in terms of access to / generation of new technologies 
and the diffusion of existing innovations are amongst the key determinants of a country's 
productivity performance. International comparisons reveal sizeable disparities in investments 
with regard to physical capital (especially in terms of ICT capital spending), human capital as 
well as R&D and other forms of intangible investments. The present study will examine those 
countries and industries where the differences are most acute and assess the extent to which 
the differences can be linked with overall growth divergences.  
 
Whilst such an analysis at the macro level has been possible for some time, a detailed cross-
country examination at the industry level has been more problematic due to the fact that long 
runs of official industry level data were only available for a relatively small number of 
countries, industries and variables. This situation has significantly improved with the March 
2007 release of the EU KLEMS datasets. The provision in EU KLEMS of detailed industry 
level series on economic growth, productivity, employment creation, capital formation and 
technological change for a large range of manufacturing and service industries is particularly 
noteworthy. A degree of caution is warranted however since the overall quality of the datasets 
has yet to be thoroughly evaluated by the national statistical institutes and Eurostat. In 
addition, according to EU KLEMS, the EU-US productivity differences are heavily 
concentrated in the market services sector where the conceptual and empirical problems in 
accurately measuring output and price developments have been well documented.  
 
Despite these ongoing difficulties, the EU KLEMS project undoubtedly represents a unique 
collective effort on behalf of academics, statisticians and policy makers to provide 
fundamental policy insights into the changes which have occurred at the industry level in 
Europe, the US and Japan over recent decades. The value added of EU KLEMS is underlined 
by the provision of detailed industry level capital and labour accounts (and intermediates in 
the case of gross output) which have been assembled at the national level by the EU KLEMS 
consortium partners : 
 
•  Firstly, industry level investment series have been collected for 7 different types of 
capital and for 31 industries (A31 level breakdown). These national accounts sourced 
series are aggregated on the basis of the user cost of capital (i.e. the rental price of 
employing each asset type for a particular period of time) to produce capital service 
flows which take into account the widely different marginal productivities of the 
different components of a country's capital stock.  
 
•  Secondly, unlike standard measures of labour input, such as numbers employed or 
hours worked, the database provides, industry level, measures which take account of 
the wide differences in the productivity of various types of labour over time (i.e. 
labour services). Labour force heterogeneity is an integral part of these labour services 
calculations, with the overall growth contribution of labour being calculated on the 
basis of the services provided by different groups of employed workers.  
 
These industry level labour and capital accounts are crucial in making a more accurate 
assessment of the contribution of capital and labour to productivity and value added growth in 
the different economies. They are particularly pertinent at the present time given the 
unprecedented deepening in global trade and capital market integration since the early 1990's, 
allied to the cost-induced and ICT-enabled acceleration in the worldwide relocation of 
  3production processes over this period. These globalisation-related processes have dramatically 
changed the economics of specific industries. Changes have occurred in terms of scale 
economies, technological spillovers (i.e. diffusion of best technologies / practices); the degree 
of import competition; and the productivity effects from the reallocation of resources amongst 
the different market players. Many of these globalisation related transmission mechanisms are 
having direct knock-on effects in terms of the specialisation patterns of individual countries, 
with the result that the post-1995 period has been marked by significant, industry-driven, 
divergences in the productivity and GDP per capita growth trends of specific countries and 
regions around the world. 
 
Given the above, it is clear that EU KLEMS offers the research community an important 
additional source of information with which to deepen its existing analyses of productivity 
developments. The potential of this new dataset has already been exploited for a detailed 
analysis of sectoral and industry level productivity trends in chapter 2 of "The EU Economy 
2007 Review" which concluded that cross-country differences in labour productivity growth 
predominantly reflect differences in TFP performances, although ICT investment patterns 
also played a role in a number of specific industries, especially over the second half of the 
1990's. Since TFP is normally regarded as constituting the structural component of labour 
productivity, the present paper examines in more detail the possible sources of these industry 
level divergences in TFP performance. Using EU KLEMS and a wide range of pertinent 
datasets for the explanatory variables, panel regressions are employed to assess the degree of 
statistical support which exists for the major hypotheses explaining TFP divergences over 
time
4– i.e. the role played by the regulatory environment (product, labour and financial 
markets)
5; by the degree of openness of economies
6; by demographics
7; and finally by the 
efficiency of knowledge production (R&D, education and complementary, ICT-related, 
investments)
8. The concluding remarks section looks at the implications of the analysis for 
the overall direction and sectoral focus of economic policy in the EU over the coming years. 
 
2. Understanding the determinants of TFP growth: What can we learn from EU 
KLEMS ? 
 
The EU KLEMS analysis in the "EU Economy 2007 Review" showed that the bulk of the 
EU-US productivity growth differential since 1995 stemmed from diverging trends with 
respect to total factor productivity (TFP) – a measure of the efficiency with which all factor 
inputs, including labour, ICT capital and conventional capital (non-ICT equipment and 
structures), are utilised. Differences between the EU and the US with respect to the growth of 
capital per worker played much less of a role in shaping the productivity gap, although a 
further breakdown of the contribution of capital services showed that a shift from 
conventional to ICT-related capital can be observed in the United States, especially in the 
private services sector, whereas a similar trend is not discernible to the same degree in 
                                                 
4  See Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), and Mendoza et al (1997). 
 
5 See Soskice (1997), Nickell et al. (1997), Eichengreen and Iversen (1999), Nickell and Layard (1999), Nicoletti et al 
(2001), Scarpetta and Tressel (2002), Scarpetta et al (2002), and IMF (2003). 
 
6  See Sachs and Warner (1995), Alesina et al (1997), Frankel and Romer (1999), and Ben-David and Kimhi (2000). 
 
7  See EU Review (2002) and Jones (2002). 
 
8 See Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), Coe and Helpman (1995), and Aghion and Howitt 
(1998). 
 
  4Europe. With respect to TFP, almost all of the EU-US TFP growth differential is attributable 
to developments in only a handful of industries in the manufacturing and private services 
sectors, including electrical and optical equipment (which includes semiconductors, the main 
ICT producing industry); wholesale and retail trade; real estate and other business services; 
and to a lesser extent financial services. Consequently, in the following analysis there will be 
an attempt to identify the determinants of TFP growth in several of these key industries where 
the EU-US TFP growth gap is concentrated. By isolating those factors which are critical in 
explaining differences in the evolution of TFP, the analysis tries to identify those policies 
which could potentially have the strongest impact in those areas of the economy where the 
TFP gaps are largest.  
 
2.1 Conceptual framework  
 
A better understanding of the key determinants of TFP growth has been high on the research 
agenda of international organisations and the academic community over the past decade. For a 
long period of time growth theory was not endowed with an appropriate paradigm to explain 
the determinants of TFP growth. In the standard neoclassical growth framework, TFP is 
exogenous and corresponds to the "Solow residual". In the early wave of endogenous growth 
models (the so-called "AK models") TFP growth is often the result of capital accumulation, 
which is assumed not to be subject to decreasing returns to scale, with the implication that 
growth-friendly policies should be focussed on promoting savings and investment. The 
predictions of these models do not appear to be consistent with recent stylised facts regarding 
the EU's growth performance with, for example, investment rates in the second half of the 
1990s being higher in Europe than in the US, whilst TFP growth stagnated in the former 
group of countries and was sustained in the latter.   
 
There is a growing consensus in the literature that recent growth theories, based on 
"Schumpeterian" creative destruction mechanisms, seem better equipped to interpret recent 
developments in the EU's growth performance (see, for example, Aghion and Howitt 
(2005))
9. This theory focuses on innovation as the key driver of growth in economies at, or 
close to, the "technology frontier"
10. Innovators, by introducing superior product varieties and 
technologies, have the effect of both displacing existing firms and of inducing the adoption of 
new products and techniques at the wider industry level. At the aggregate level, the 
innovation rate depends on the resources devoted to the innovation effort (i.e. R&D and 
human capital) and on the stock of existing knowledge (knowledge spillovers). The growth 
rate of the economy will depend not only on the rate of innovation but also on the rate at 
which "state-of-the-art" technologies are adopted / diffused throughout the wider economy. 
Countries that are close to the technology frontier will mainly grow thanks to the introduction 
of new technologies, whilst the "follower" grouping of countries will derive the largest share 
of their TFP growth from the adoption of better, but already existing, technologies which are 
available "at the frontier".  
 
In this "Schumpeterian" world, institutions and policies play a key role in determining the 
relative position of countries in the global innovation race. These framework conditions 
directly impact on the relative ability of countries to innovate at the frontier or to adopt 
existing, leading-edge, technologies. Whilst follower countries would gain from institutions 
and policies favouring the cost efficient adoption of existing technologies, countries operating 
                                                 
9 For earlier analyses, see also Nelson and Phelps (1966), Abramowitz (1986) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). 
 
10 Hence, the focus is on TFP growth as the engine of growth. 
  5at the frontier would, on the other hand, profit from policies that promote excellence in higher 
education and R&D; financial markets that reward risky projects; and regulations that do not 
put an excessively heavy burden on either incumbent firms nor on potential entrants.  
 
These latter views were reflected in the Sapir report (Sapir, et al. 2003), which was 
commissioned by the European Commission Presidency to identify policy priorities to re-
launch economic growth in the EU. The report concluded that the EU's disappointing growth 
performance since the mid-1990 was due to institutions which were not sufficiently 
supportive of an innovation-based economy. High growth in the post-WWII era was driven by 
high levels of industrial production, economies of scale and imitation of US technological 
advances. As the EU approached the technological frontier, growth became increasingly 
dependent on innovation. The report suggests that the EU should focus on reforming their 
education systems; promoting higher levels of better targeted R&D; ensuring better regulation 
to facilitate the entry and exit of firms (instead of focussing on competition between existing 
players); providing more adequate infrastructure to facilitate the free movement of people, 
goods and ideas; stimulating innovation via financial and tax incentives; and promoting more 
labour market flexibility, notably through a lower tax burden on workers. 
 
2.2. Existing empirical work   
 
A number of papers in the literature have already analysed the determinants of TFP in a 
Schumpeterian framework. Most of the existing analyses use panel data information, pooling 
together data on TFP levels and growth rates over several years and countries. Some papers 
also use information at the sectoral / industry levels, with the datasets usually obtained from 
the OECD's STAN database
11. The available empirical specifications normally reflect a 
reduced form of the basic innovation-imitation model, with most of them regressing TFP 
growth on two key explanatory variables:  
 
•  a measure of the technology gap (i.e. the distance between the TFP of the country 
analysed and that of the country with the highest level of efficiency); and  
 
•  an estimate of the growth rate of TFP at the frontier (i.e. the TFP growth rate of the 
most efficient country).  
 
The first variable captures the extent to which TFP growth in a specific country can be 
explained by the adoption of more efficient existing technologies. The assumption here is 
simply that the larger the technology gap, the higher the potential gains from adopting more 
efficient, internationally available, technologies and consequently the faster the rate of TFP 
growth. The second variable aims at capturing the link between TFP growth in the "catching-
up" country with the extent of innovation and knowledge spillovers which are taking place in 
the technologically most advanced country.  
 
In addition to the above basic explanatory variables, most papers also control for a series of 
policy and institutional factors that may affect the rate of TFP growth independently or may 
interact with the "technology gap" and "technology spillovers" variables to have an impact on 
TFP. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) analyse sectoral TFP growth in a panel of OECD 
countries and find some support for the view that entry liberalisation and privatisation have a 
positive impact on TFP. Moreover, this impact appears to be stronger the further away are 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and (2005); Griffith, Redding, and Van Reenen (2004), Conway et al. 
(2006). 
  6countries from the technology frontier. The interpretation is that entry regulation and public 
ownership prevents the adoption of existing up-to-date technologies, so that the impact is 
greater away from the frontier, where TFP growth is more strongly based on adoption rather 
than on innovation. This result contrasts with the findings in Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, 
Griffith and Howitt (2003) who analyse the patenting activity of UK firms at the US patenting 
office. They find that when firms are close to the national technological frontier that product 
market competition has a stronger positive impact for innovation. This conclusion can be 
explained by the observation that being far from the frontier reduced the incentives to 
innovate by reducing innovators' rents more strongly. A similar result is obtained in Aghion, 
Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Prantl (2006) who analyse patenting activity and TFP growth at 
the firm and establishment levels in the UK.   
 
In Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003), it is also found that a human capital variable has a positive 
impact on TFP growth, although not always significant. Vandenbussche, Aghion and Méghir 
(2005) analyse aggregate TFP determinants in a panel of OECD countries and show that high-
skilled human capital has a positive effect on TFP growth, an effect which is stronger the 
closer a country is to the technology frontier.  
 
Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2004) study TFP determinants across sectors in a panel of 
OECD countries and show that R&D has both a direct impact on TFP growth and a role in 
facilitating the cross-country convergence of TFP levels. The result is interpreted as providing 
support for the two "faces" of R&D in promoting productivity growth: on the one hand, R&D 
enhances a firm's innovative potential (thus increasing directly the rate of TFP growth); on the 
other hand, it improves the absorptive capacity of firms and industries, thus facilitating the 
adoption of existing technologies and spurring TFP convergence.  
 
Most of the existing analyses at a sectoral level are limited to manufacturing industries. 
However, we learned earlier that TFP growth rates in Europe and the US have been diverging, 
in recent times, especially in market services. Hence, a better understanding of the TFP 
growth determinants in these industries is crucial in assessing the factors which are driving 
the EU's widening productivity gap with the US. With a view to addressing such questions, 
Inklaar, Timmer and Van Ark (2008) analyse the determinants of TFP growth in market 
services using the EU KLEMS database. Their analysis shows that although ICT investments 
were a main driver of labour productivity growth in the service sectors of both the EU and the 
US, the adoption of ICT-intensive technologies does not appear to be associated with higher 
growth rates of TFP. Additionally, human capital intensity has no significant explanatory 
power for TFP growth and entry regulations mattered only in telecommunications, but not in 
other market service industries.   
 
2.3. Empirical strategy  
 
The aim of the following analysis is to take a step forward compared with existing work by 
capitalising on the recent release of the EU KLEMS datasets and specifically on the increased 
availability of TFP data series and of substantially enhanced industry level detail. Compared 
with Inklaar, Timmer, and Van Ark (2008), we will not limit the analysis to market services. 
Additionally, there will be an attempt to identify the determinants of TFP growth in a number 
of specific industry groupings that contributed most to the EU-US TFP growth gap, namely 
ICT- producing manufacturing industries and retail services, and for those industries where 
EU countires exhibited a stronger performance, i.e. public utilities. Compared with existing 
  7analyses, there will also be an attempt to control for a potentially large number of policy and 
institutional variables.  
 
The analysis concerns 9 EU countries plus the US over the 1980-2004 period and covers a 
total of 28 industries
12. The baseline specification is similar to that found in existing analyses 
(e.g., Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003)). TFP growth rates are regressed over a measure of 
innovation / technology spillovers (i.e. the TFP growth rate of the leader country) and of a 
technology gap term (i.e. the lagged logarithm of the difference between TFP in a specific 
country and TFP at the frontier, with the frontier being determined by the country exhibiting 
the highest TFP level in that particular industry, in that particular year). Country, sector and 
year fixed effects control for factors that independently may affect TFP growth rates.  
 
The TFP growth rates used in the analysis are those computed using the established "ex-post" 
capital services method in the EU KLEMS database. With regard to the measurement of the 
technology gap variable, we make use of the PPP-adjusted TFP levels dataset provided for the 
10 countries in Inklaar, Timmer and Van Ark (2007)
13. As a countercheck, TFP data obtained 
using an "ex-ante" approach, and "raw" TFP measures that do not distinguish between labour 
with different skill levels and between ICT and non-ICT capital, are also used
14.  
 
The baseline specification has subsequently been augmented in such a way as to control for 
the impact of ICT and human capital, R&D, regulations, and other framework conditions. In 
the following section, only the specifications exhibiting the strongest explanatory power are 
displayed. A long list of country-level variables, capturing overall macroeconomic conditions; 
the presence of those economy-wide infrastructures which are most closely associated with 
the development of new technologies; demographic factors; barriers to entry; and 










                                                 
12 The 9 EU countries are Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and the UK. The 28 
industries are taken from the NACE A31 industry breakdown. Data is only available for a total of 28 industries since some of 
the smaller headings have been merged with other NACE codes. 
 
13 The TFP levels data in Inklaar, Timmer and Van Ark  (2007) refer to the year 1997. TFP levels for other years are derived 
from TFP growth rates computed ex-ante. R. Inklaar is gratefully acknowledged for providing the TFP levels data produced 
in Inklaar, Timmer and Van Ark  (2007). 
 
14 The difference between the ex-post and the ex-ante method for computing TFP is that the latter is based on an exogenous 
value for the rate of return whereas the ex-post approach estimates the internal rate of return as a residual given the value of 
capital compensation from the national accounts and estimates for depreciation and capital gains.  
 
15 The data sources for these variables are as follows : European Commission DG ECFIN's AMECO database for 
macroeconomic conditions (output gap, relative contribution of consumption to GDP growth, relative contribution of 
investment to GDP growth); Barro and Lee data on economy-wide education indicators; World Bank Development Indicators 
for infrastructure (number of internet users, computer diffusion, share of population with tertiary degree, public spending on 
education, public spending on R&D, number of patent applications) and for the age structure of the population; OECD for 
economy-wide indicators of product market regulation and barriers to competition (public ownership of firms, public 
involvement in business operations, regulatory and administrative opacity, administrative burden on start ups, barriers to 
competition, explicit barriers to foreign trade and investment, other barriers to foreign trade and investment). 
  8 
2.4. Regression results 
 
2.4.1. Baseline specification: Table 1 presents the results for the baseline specification
16. 
Across the whole sample (column (1)), the results suggest that TFP growth is higher when 
there is stronger TFP growth in the frontier economy (reflecting the impact of innovation and 
technology spillovers) and when the technology gap is larger (which reflects TFP 
convergence via the adoption of existing superior technologies).  
 
In comparison with previous similar analyses, whilst a significantly negative relationship 
between TFP growth and the gap in technology is generally found, the impact of TFP growth 
at the frontier is not always significant (e.g., Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003)). Given that our 
results are strongly significant for "frontier" growth effects, as a robustness check, column (2) 
in Table 1 also reports the same specification as in column (1) but using "ex-ante" calculated 
TFP growth rates. It is comforting to note that the results are broadly similar in terms of the 
coefficient estimate and its significance level. What appears to matter instead for the result is 
the distinction between labour skills and ICT and non-ICT capital when constructing the TFP 
variable. Indeed, by repeating the baseline regressions using a "raw" measure of TFP that 
does not distinguish between labour with different skills and that does not differentiate the 
marginal productivity of ICT capital, TFP growth taking place at the frontier does not appear 
to significantly affect TFP growth rates (column (3)). This result suggests that the possibility 
of taking into account labour and capital inputs of different quality (as is possible with the EU 
KLEMS database) permits one to get closer to a measure of TFP growth which reflects 
innovation dynamics and the introduction of new technologies to a greater extent than 
"cruder" TFP measures. On the basis of the more "sophisticated" TFP measures in EU 
KLEMS, TFP improvements appear to be more strongly affected by developments taking 
place at the frontier.   
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N. obs.  6619  6059  6677  3058  2133  2371  2796 
R
2 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.16 0.10  0.50  0.12 
Notes: Estimation method: panel OLS regressions; fixed effects included for countries, sectors, and years; standard errors robust with respect 
to heteroschedasticity and possible correlation within countries. Absolute value of t tests reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote, 
respectively, statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent level. 
TFP growth at the frontier: TFP growth of the country with the highest TFP level in sector s, year t (leader country). 
Technological gap: lagged log(TFP level –TFP level of the leader country). 
 
                                                 
 
16 Since the explanatory variables are likely to be exogenous, OLS estimation methods are used. Standard errors are robust 
with respect to heteroschedasticity and the possible autocorrelation of the residuals within countries. 
  9Table 1 also reports results for the basic specification based on different sectoral breakdowns 
and time periods. Column (4) reports the results when the sample is restricted to the 
manufacturing sector, whilst columns (5) and (6) do the same for, respectively, private 
services and ICT-related sectors (the latter comprises both ICT producing manufacturing 
sectors and all sectors of the economy that use ICT goods intensively). Column (7) reports 
results for all sectors but in years after 1995 only. A number of results stand out. Firstly, 
innovation and knowledge spillovers have a broadly similar effect on the TFP growth 
performance of the manufacturing, private services and ICT-related sectors, as indicated by a 
similar value for the coefficient of TFP growth at the frontier. Secondly, regarding the 
technology gap term, TFP growth in the manufacturing sector is relatively more driven by the 
adoption of superior existing technologies, compared with the private services and ICT 
related sectors. Finally, in restricting the analysis to the last decade of the sample (i.e. 1995-
2004), TFP growth appears to be mostly driven by growth at the frontier, with a non-
significant impact from the technology gap variable. This finding is consistent with the view 
that across Europe, growth is increasingly being driven by innovation activity and less by the 
adoption of existing up-to date technologies. Given these emerging patterns, these results 
could be interpreted somewhat negatively given that they appear to indicate that the extent of 
catching-up across countries is weakening over time. 
 
2.4.2. The role of human capital, ICT capital, and R&D : Table 2 reports the results for the 
basic specification augmented to take into account the role of human capital, ICT capital, and 
R&D in affecting TFP growth. On top of the determinants included in the basic specification, 
the share of skilled labour compensation, the share of R&D expenditure, and the share of ICT 
capital and non-ICT capital are added to control for, respectively, the role of human capital, 
R&D, and ICT technologies. All variables vary across countries and sectors and over time.
 17
 
These additional variables, when introduced in the baseline specification (whilst keeping 
country, sector, and year fixed effects) appear not to have significant explanatory power.
18 A 
possible explanation for this poor performance for factors commonly regarded as relevant for 
TFP dynamics could be that the sample period is not sufficiently long for the impact of these 
variables to become manifest, or that such effects unfold only gradually and with long lags. 
The presence of country and fixed effects imply that the impact of the explanatory variables 
on TFP growth is captured mostly along the time dimension. In order to allow the cross-
country dimension to play a role, in column (2) we repeat the same regression as in column 
(1) but eliminating the country fixed effects. It turns out, allowing for a cross-country 
dimension, that human capital and R&D play a clearly positive role and have a stronger 
statistical significance, whilst ICT is still largely insignificant. Column (3) repeats the 
regression excluding the sector fixed effects. It appears that it is the variation across sectors 
that permits one to identify a largely significant role for R&D and ICT intensity. In sum, 
while it seems, other things being equal, that sectors characterised by higher R&D and ICT 
intensity tend to exhibit higher growth rates of TFP, an across the board increase in R&D and 
ICT intensity does not appear to translate into higher TFP growth. This result helps to qualify 
those previously obtained in Inklaar, Timmer, and van Ark (2008) regarding the role of ICT 
                                                 
17 More traditional measures of human capital, like educational attainment levels in the whole economy (Barro and Lee 
source) were tested but produced only small and insignificant effects.  
 
18 An exception is the ICT variable when restricting the sample to manufacturing only (column (7)). In this case, the 
coefficient appears to be significantly negative. A possible explanation is that the introduction of ICT technologies require a 
re-adaptation of production methods and organization, which could have a temporary negative impact on TFP (see, for 
example, Basu and Fernald (2007)). The results suggest that such temporary negative TFP effects from ICT are mostly felt in 
manufacturing. 
  10in market services. Even if their ICT variable differs from ours (being defined as the share of 
ICT capital returns on total costs), their regressions also include fixed effects for countries, 
sectors, and years.  
 
A further check on the above results is provided in columns (4) and (5), where regression 
results without, respectively, country and sector effects are displayed when the TFP measure 
used is “raw” i.e. it does not take into account labour and capital composition effects. With 
this measure of TFP, a role for human capital is found for the specification excluding country 
fixed effects. Countries where the skill intensity of production technologies is higher tend to 
exhibit higher TFP growth rates, other things being equal. The fact that this result holds only 
with a “raw” TFP measure suggests that part of the explanation for the role of human capital 
is related to the fact that TFP growth also captures labour productivity improvements 
associated with the secular rise in the skill levels of the workforce in general, and that these 
improvements are stronger in the countries exhibiting higher skill levels on average over the 
sample period. 
 
As shown in previous analyses, the impact of human capital and R&D may depend on the 
degree of technological advancement of countries, as captured by distance from the frontier. 
In order to capture this effect, we add as an explanatory variable our human capital and R&D 
measures interacted with the “technological gap” variable. In addition, we also interact human 
capital and R&D with the “TFP growth at the frontier” variable. The idea in this case is that 
R&D and human capital could be factors facilitating innovation and the absorption of 
technological spillovers emanating from the technological frontier. To our knowledge this 
interaction was not performed in previous analyses. A reason could be the weak explanatory 
power of TFP growth at the frontier as a regressor when using TFP data which fails to 
appropriately take into account the change in the quality composition of labour and capital, 
which is not the case with the EU KLEMS data.  
 
Furthermore, since the human capital and R&D variables are standardised in such a way as to 
have zero mean and unit standard deviation, and since both variables (subject to interaction) 
are included independently in the empirical specification, the interpretation of the interacted 
variables is easy. The value of the coefficient of, say, human capital interacted with the 
technological gap term, represents the change in the technological gap variable associated 
with a one-standard-deviation increase in the share of skilled labour compensation in total 
labour compensation. Thus, a positive (negative) coefficient means that more human capital is 
associated with slower (faster) TFP convergence. The regression coefficient of the non-
interacted “technology at the frontier” and technological gap variable represents their impact 
keeping the value of human capital at zero, i.e., at sample mean. An alternative interpretation 
is that the change in the coefficient of the human capital variable is associated with a one per 
cent reduction in the technological gap (i.e. the percentage distance between the TFP in a 
given country, sector and year and the highest TFP value found across countries in the same 
sector in that year). Thus, a positive (negative) coefficient means that being closer to (further 
away from) the frontier raises the impact of human capital. Analogous interpretations are 
given for the remaining interacted variables. 
 
Column (6) reports the results across the whole sample of sectors. Columns (7), (8), and (9) 
repeat the same regression limiting the sample to manufacturing, market services, and ICT-
related industries respectively. It appears that, across all sectors, human capital has a positive 
and almost statistically significant coefficient when interacted with both the technological gap 
variable and TFP growth at the frontier. Hence, consistent with Vandenbussche, Aghion and 
  11Méghir (2005), we also find that the positive impact of human capital is stronger the smaller 
is the technological gap. Moreover, human capital also permits one to share in the TFP 
improvements taking place at the frontier, either because analogous innovations to those put 
in place at the frontier become more likely also “at the periphery”, or because the capacity to 
absorb technological spillovers increases with human capital. This role of human capital as 
facilitator of frontier-type innovation and technological spillovers is highly visible especially 
when restricting the analysis to market services. In this case, the coefficient of the human 
capital variable interacted with TFP growth at the frontier is highly significant. R&D also 
appears to have a positive effect on the ability of a country to share in the TFP improvements 
taking place at the frontier, as revealed by the positive coefficient of the R&D variable 
interacted with TFP growth at the frontier, and this effect is stronger in market services. 
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Country fixed 
effects 
Yes No Yes  No  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Sector  fixed  effects  Yes Yes No  Yes  No  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Year  fixed  effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
N.  obs.  2251 2251 2251  2242  2242  2251 1535  574  786 
R
2 0.20 0.19 0.19  0.12  0.12  0.22 0.23 0.21  0.32 
               
Notes:  
Estimation method: panel OLS regressions; standard errors robust with respect to heteroschedasticity and possible correlation within 
countries. Absolute value of t tests reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote, respectively, statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent 
level. 
TFP growth at the frontier: TFP growth of the country with the highest TFP level in sector s, year t (leader country). Source EU KLEMS. 
Technological gap: lagged log (TFP level –log(TFP level of the leader country). Source: EU KLEMS. 
Human capital: share of high skill labour compensation in total labour compensation. Standardised variable. Source: EU KLEMS. 
R&D: R&D expenditure/gross output. Standardized variable. Source: OECD STAN. 
ICT/non ICT real capital stock ratio. Source: EU KLEMS. 
  12In summary, ICT, human capital, and R&D appear to play some role in TFP growth. 
However, results seem sensitive to the specification and in particular to the inclusion of sector 
and country effects and to the approach for measuring TFP. R&D and ICT intensive 
technologies have a positive impact on TFP only if sector effects are not included, which 
implies that the relationship is mostly found across sectors. Human capital plays a role in 
facilitating innovation and spillovers, as indicated by its positive interaction with the “TFP 
growth at the frontier” variable, which is highly significant especially when the analysis is 
limited to market services. The impact of human capital also appears stronger the closer is the 
economy to the technological frontier, a result which confirms the findings of existing 
analyses.  
 
2.4.3. The role of regulations : The next series of TFP determinants analysed are regulations 
in product and factor markets. Recent research carried out in international organisations has 
emphasised the role of regulations in driving efficiency gains (e.g., OECD (2003), IMF 
(2003)). In addition, the literature which is more closely focused on assessing TFP growth 
determinants also tends to find some impact of regulations on the growth of TFP (see section 
2.2.). In our analysis we have considered regulations in product markets and labour and 
financial markets separately. Product market regulations are captured by the “Regimpact” 
indicator developed by the OECD (Conway and Nicoletti (2006)), which measures the 
“knock-on” effect in each sector of the economy arising from anti-competitive regulations in 
non-manufacturing sectors. Labour market and financial market regulations are summarised 
by the “freedom indicators” constructed by the Fraser institute. The indicators quantify the 
degree of absence of anti-competitive regulations in, respectively, the labour and financial 
markets. We consider the impact of these indicators taken with a minus sign, to capture 
instead the effect associated with regulations becoming heavier. All indicators vary across 
countries and sectors and over time. 
 
Table 3 displays the results. While regulations do not appear to play a significant role when 
directly added to the list of explanatory variables (and keeping all sectors in the sample 
(column (1)), their impact is found to be significant when distinguishing sub-groups of 
industries. Moreover, their interaction with TFP growth at the frontier and the technology gap 
variable reveals some significant effects.  
 
The results displayed in column (2) suggest that, across all industries, anti-competitive 
financial market regulations appear to reduce TFP growth directly, and the more so the closer 
is the economy to the technological frontier. Moreover, heavier financial market regulations 
reduce the extent to which the economy can share in TFP improvements taking place at the 
frontier. The same regression shows that more regulated labour markets, although reducing 
TFP growth directly, have a significant impact on the extent to which TFP growth benefits 
from developments at the frontier. This evidence highlights the ambiguous role that may be 
played by labour market regulations on TFP growth (see, e.g, Bassanini and Ernst -2002- for a 
discussion of the alternative channels highlighted in the theoretical literature). On the one 
hand, stricter labour market regulations, notably employment protection legislation, by 
limiting the room for re-adjusting the labour force in the case of redundancies, may hinder the 
incentives of firms to engage in risky innovation projects, thus reducing TFP growth at the 
frontier. On the other hand, stronger protection of employment may increase job-tenure and 
investment in job-specific skills, which may be complementary to TFP growth (Acemoglu 
and Shimer (2000)) The impact of product market regulation appears to be largely 
insignificant. 
 
  13Column (3) repeats the same specification as in column (2) but restricted to manufacturing. 
Unexpectedly, product market regulations appear to play a positive impact on TFP growth 
both directly and via increased benefits from developments at the frontier. The role of 
financial market regulations in limiting such benefits is strengthened compared with the case 
in which the analysis comprises all sectors. By limiting the sample to market services, the 
impact of product market regulations turns negative, and appears to play an effect both 
directly and indirectly. In particular, product market regulations appear to reduce TFP growth 
more strongly when the economy is closer to the frontier. Financial market regulations, 
conversely, result in having a significantly stronger negative impact the further away is the 
economy from the technological frontier. The regressions for ICT-related industries are 
analogous to those for manufacturing for what concerns the role of product market 
regulations, and to that for market services regarding labour and financial market regulations. 
 
Table 3 : The role of regulations 
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N.  obs.  6340 6340 2929 2043 2271 
R
2 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.11 0.22 
Notes: Estimation method: panel OLS regressions; fixed effects included for countries, sectors, and years; standard errors robust with respect 
to heteroschedasticity and possible correlation within countries. Absolute value of t tests reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote, 
respectively, statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent level. 
TFP growth at the frontier: TFP growth of the country with the highest TFP level in sector s, year t (leader country). Source: EU KLEMS. 
Technological gap: lagged log(TFP level )–log(TFP level of the leader country). Source: EU KLEMS. 
Product market regulation: indicator of the "knock on" sectoral impact of regulations in non-manufacturing sectors. Standardised variable. 
Source: OECD "Regimpact" indicator. 
Labour market regulation: indicator of anti-competitive regulations in the labour market. Standardised variable. Source: Fraser institute 
freedom indicators (taken with negative sign). 
Financial market regulation: indicator of anti-competitive regulations in the labour market. Standardised variable. Source: Fraser institute 
freedom indicators (taken with negative sign). 
 
Overall, the role of regulations appears to be highly sector-specific. Results suffer from 
robustness checks with respect to the specification chosen and the sample definition. 
Additionally, the limited time-variation of the sample used in the regressions makes it 
  14difficult to disentangle the short term transitional effects of labour market reforms, introduced 
by many EU countries since the early 1990's, from the long run impact of those reforms on 
TFP growth rates. In spite of these caveats and limitations, some results of interest stand up. 
As expected product market regulations appear to play a negative role for TFP growth in 
market services. Financial market regulations seem to play a negative role especially 
concerning the ability of countries to share in TFP improvements taking place at the frontier.  
 
2.4.4. Industry-specific specifications: Part of the problems experienced with the regulatory 
regressions may be linked to the need to use a lower level of disaggregation than the broad 
sectoral aggregates which were used for the analysis in Table 3. This highlights the necessity 
of adapting the empirical model of TFP growth determinants to the different specificities of 
industries. In the following, our aim is to identify empirical models specific to those industries 
that gave a large contribution to the EU-US TFP growth gap as well as for those industries 
where the EU performance was comparatively satisfactory.  
 
As shown earlier, the EU-US TFP gap is concentrated in the ICT producing manufacturing 
industry (i.e. electrical and optical equipment which includes semi-conductors) and a number 
of private service industries. In addition to showing where the EU is underperforming, graph 
1 also shows that there is a small group of industries where the EU has outperformed the US 
over the past decade i.e. the "network" industries.  
 
Graph 1 : EU + US – Trend Contributions from TFP in the "Network Industries" to the Value Added 

































EU15ex US  
Source : EU KLEMS, Commission services 
 
Table 4 presents the results for those TFP determinants which have been selected for ICT-
manufacturing industries and retail services as representatives of those sectors accounting for 
a large share of the EU-US productivity gap, and for utilities, as an example of a sector where 
the EU has a relatively strong performance. Since the aim is to identify TFP determinants that 
are distinctive for the sectors under analysis, the table also reports results when the selected 
variables are used to explain TFP growth in all of the remaining sectors. 
 
Column (1) shows that for the ICT producing industry (i.e. electrical and optical equipment), 
the basic variables behave somewhat differently to prior expectations. The frontier and 
technology gap variables are non-significant, with the latter indicating that TFP growth rather 
than converging is diverging across countries in this particular industry. This result is 
consistent with the existing evidence which suggests that labour productivity in the "high 
tech" sectors is not converging across countries, in contrast with what is observed for most 
other sectors (see, for example, Scarpetta and Tressel (2002)). Interestingly, the results change 
drastically when the same specification is tested on "total industries" excluding the ICT-
producing manufacturing industry itself (column (2)).  
  15Regarding retail and wholesale trade services (column (3)), the results indicate a significant 
role for cyclical factors in providing a direct explanation for observed differences in TFP 
growth between the US and the EU's Member States (as suggested by the strongly significant 
positive coefficient for the relative contribution of private consumption to GDP growth).
19 
Due to its construction as a residual term, TFP growth also captures productivity 
improvements associated with the better exploitation of scale economies, which are likely to 
be a relevant factor in explaining productivity dynamics in this group of service industries. It 
is worth noting that a similar positive impact of cyclical factors is not observed in the 
remaining sectors (column (4)).  
 
Table 4: Industry-specific models 
 ICT  producing  manufacturing  Retail  and affiliated industries  Utilities 
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Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N. obs.  141  2497  836  5030  684  5656 
R
2 0.56 0.18  0.17  0.14  0.22  0.13 
Notes: Estimation method: panel OLS regressions; fixed effects included for countries, sectors, and years; standard errors robust with respect 
to heteroschedasticity and possible correlation within countries. Absolute value of t tests reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote, 
respectively, statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per cent level. 
TFP growth at the frontier : TFP growth of the country with the highest TFP level in sector s, year t (leader country). Source: EU KLEMS. 
Technological gap : lagged log (TFP level )–log(TFP level of the leader country). Source: EU KLEMS. 
R&D : R&D expenditure/gross output. Standardized variable. Source: OECD STAN. 
Human capital: share of high skill labour compensation in total labour compensation. Standardised variable. Source: EU KLEMS. 
Relative contribution of private consumption to GDP growth: GDP growth due to private consumption/GDP growth. Source AMECO. 
Product market regulation: indicator of the "knock on" sectoral impact of regulations in non-manufacturing sectors. Standardised variable. 
Source: OECD "Regimpact" indicator. 
Financial market regulation: indicator of anti-competitive regulations in the labour market. Standardised variable. Source: Fraser institute 
freedom indicators (taken with negative sign). 
ICT-producing manufactures: electrical and optical equipment (30t33). 
Retail and affiliated industries : Retail sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motor cycles (50) + wholesale trade and 
commission trade except motor vehicles and motor cycles (51) + Repair of household goods and retail trade except of motor vehicles and 
motor cycles (52) + hotels and restaurants (H). 
Utilities : energy (E)+transport and storage (60t63)+post and telecommunications (64). 
 
                                                 
19 A role for cyclical factors is suggested also by the positive and significant coefficient of the output gap as an alternative  
explanatory variable. 
  16Finally, regarding the "network" industries, product market regulations are shown to have a 
significant negative impact on this grouping of industries but not on the rest of the economy 
(for which the coefficient has instead an unexpected positive sign - see column (6)). This 
regulatory impact appears to reflect the "knock-on" effects of regulations in this specific 
industry grouping on all other sectors of the economy. Its influence is likely to be particularly 
high, given the amount of regulations which have tended, in the past at least, to be imposed on 
a number of individual network industries, including electricity, gas and water, as well as on 
transport and communications. The direct impact exercised should however be interpreted 
mostly in terms of the better exploitation of scale economies and reduced "X inefficiencies" 
rather than to any dynamic TFP gains. 
 
2.5. Summary of the main policy-relevant results: Whilst bearing in mind the need for 
caution in interpreting results that inevitably suffer, to some extent, from the imperfect 
measurement of TFP and from a number of robustness issues in the econometric specification, 
some potentially relevant findings stand out from our analysis. 
 
•  Firstly, compared with previous analogous studies, the use of the EU KLEMS 
database permits us to identify a statistically significant role of “TFP growth at the 
frontier” as an explanatory variable for TFP growth across the whole sample. 
Therefore, in addition to a significant TFP convergence phenomenon associated with 
the adoption of existing up-to-date technologies which is generally found in 
econometric work aimed at assessing TFP determinants with sectoral data, TFP 
growth also appears to be determined significantly by the capacity of countries to 
share in developments taking place at the frontier, either because of independently 
participating in the same innovation trajectories or because of technological 
spillovers. 
  
•  Secondly, whilst there is a generalised tendency towards catching-up across 
countries in terms of TFP growth, such a tendency seems to be weakening over time, 
especially in the post-1995 period. Moreover, for the ICT-producing manufacturing 
sector this process of catching-up is particularly weak. TFP growth appears 
increasingly associated with innovation and technological spillovers from countries 
positioned "at the frontier".  
 
•  Thirdly, ICT, human capital, and R&D appear to play some role in TFP growth. 
However, results seem sensitive to the specification and in particular to the inclusion 
of sector and country effects and to the approach for measuring TFP. R&D and ICT 
intensive technologies have a significantly positive impact on TFP only if sector 
effects are not included. The relationship therefore holds mostly across sectors : 
sectors spending more on R&D and using more ICT-intensive technologies tend to 
exhibit higher growth rates of total factor productivity. However, there is no 
significant evidence that an across-the-board increase in R&D expenditures or in the 
use of ICT-intensive technologies translates into higher TFP growth. The 
implication for policy is that what matters for aggregate TFP growth is an expansion 
of the R&D and ICT-intensive industries rather than policies aimed at raising R&D 
and ICT technologies in all industries. Human capital plays a role in facilitating 
innovation and spillovers, as indicated by its positive interaction with the “TFP 
growth at the frontier” variable, which is highly significant especially when the 
analysis is limited to market services. The impact of human capital also appears 
  17stronger the closer is the economy to the technological frontier, a result that 
confirms the findings of existing analyses.  
 
•  Fourthly, the role of regulations appears to be highly sector-specific. Results suffer 
from robustness checks with respect to the specification chosen and the sample 
definition and from the limited time-variation of the sample. Notwithstanding these 
caveats and limitations, some results of interest stand up. As expected, product 
market regulations appear to play a negative role for TFP growth in market services. 
Financial market regulations seem to play a negative role especially for what 
concerns the ability of countries to share in TFP improvements taking place at the 
frontier.  
 
•  Finally, the determinants of TFP growth appear to be largely industry-specific. 
Against this background, we attempted to identify the TFP growth determinants in 
those industries that explain the bulk of the EU-US TFP growth gap and in those 
where the EU's performance is relatively strong. Differences in the ICT-producing 
manufacturing industry appear to be firmly related to the role played by R&D in 
allowing countries to share in the TFP growth improvements taking place at the 
frontier. In the retail and wholesale trade industry, the evidence suggests a possible 
role for cyclical factors driving consumption dynamics: stronger consumption 
growth could be the source of TFP growth associated with a better exploitation of 
scale economies. Finally, TFP growth in the network industries appears to be driven 
in a comparatively strong fashion by product market regulations. In this respect, the 
satisfactory TFP growth performance in the EU in this set of industries could be 
related to the deregulation drive which characterised the behaviour of most EU 
countries towards these industries over the last two decades, and to the resultant 
more pro-competitive environment.  
 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
Over the last decade many EU15 Member States have experienced a slowdown in their 
productivity performances relative both to previous time periods and to other developed 
economies across the OECD, most notably the US. The detailed analysis of the EU KLEMS 
datasets contained in the "EU Economy 2007 Review" showed that most of the EU-US 
productivity differences were not to be found in investment patterns (although the US was 
shown to have a much greater focus on ICT related investments) but were mainly driven by 
developments in TFP, the structural component of productivity.   
 
Whilst the essentially growth accounting approach used in the "2007 Review" was helpful in 
isolating those industries / sectors where the EU-US TFP differences lay, such an analytical 
approach has little to say concerning the underlying driving factors behind the divergences 
which emerged. Using a panel regression approach, the present paper statistically assessed the 
relative importance of those TFP determinants which have been consistently highlighted in 
the literature as playing a role. Given the sample of countries used in the analysis, it is clear 
that the focus was on assessing the drivers of TFP growth at the frontier rather than on 
analysing catching-up effects (e.g., learning-by-doing and imitation effects), with the role of 
R&D, human capital and a wide range of regulatory indicators being of specific interest. One 
relatively clear finding, of a general nature, to emerge from the regression analysis was that 
  18TFP growth is increasingly associated, especially over the post-1995 period, with innovation 
and technological spillovers from countries positioned "at the frontier".  
 
With respect to understanding the TFP trends in those specific industries where EU-US 
differences are concentrated, the regression analysis suggests that a relatively wide spectrum 
of factors is implicated. Whereas R&D intensity factors are linked with the relative under-
performance of the EU's ICT producing manufacturing industry (mainly semiconductors), 
cyclical factors and the better exploitation of scale economies are a feature of the divergences 
in the retail and wholesale trade industries. Finally, with regard to the EU's out-performance 
in the network industries, there is evidence to suggest that these are mainly linked to one-off 
static efficiency gains associated with the sustained deregulation drive which occurred in 
these industries in many EU Member States over the last two decades.   
Whilst the main policy-relevant conclusions from the regression analysis, given in section 2.5, 
are undoubtedly tentative
20 in nature, they are nevertheless in accordance with the emerging 
view in the literature that the TFP growth slowdown experienced by a large number of 
advanced European economies in recent years could be linked to a generalised failure in 
Europe to sufficiently adapt its policies and institutions from its post world war II phase of 
development. Over the bulk of the post-war period, Europe drove its relatively successful 
catching-up process using an economic policy approach which in essence was focussed on 
imitating US technological advances. As convergence increasingly gave way to a phase in 
which EU countries joined, and in some cases extended, the global technology frontier, a 
large number of countries faced growing difficulties in replicating the TFP successes of 
earlier decades, with these successes in fact increasing their reluctance to acquiesce to the 
need for change.  
 
The analysis in the present study supports the view that being at, or close to, the technology 
frontier, demands a re-focussing of policies and institutions more towards an innovation-
based economic model, with less emphasis on the imitation of available, leading-edge, 
technologies and practices and more on sustained improvements in the EU's innovation 
capacity
21. The hallmarks of an open-economy, innovation driven, developmental model are 
world class educational establishments; higher levels of, excellence driven and better targeted, 
R&D; more market based financing systems; and more flexible regulatory and institutional 
frameworks delivering a dynamic and competitive business environment. Whilst many 
aspects of this approach have been introduced in recent years in individual EU countries, the 
"mindset" shift needed to make an overall success of the process has unfortunately not yet 
occurred on a sufficiently large scale at the European level, despite the fact that "Lisbon" 
provides an effective vehicle for managing this essential transition process.  
 
 
                                                 
20 While the regression results are thought provoking, it must be made clear that we are still far from a complete 
understanding of the determinants of TFP growth. Whilst a large number of explanatory variables were tested in the 
regressions, only a small number of them turned out to be significant, with the high number of insignificant variables 
suggesting that TFP is still very much a "black box". A degree of caution is also warranted given firstly that the EU KLEMS 
datasets are still in the "research" rather than the "official" statistics phase and secondly the need to be mindful of the 
conceptual and empirical problems in accurately measuring output and price developments in some of the market service 
industries where the greatest EU-US TFP differences have been found. 
 
21 The shift from an imitative (i.e. catching-up) to an innovation driven economic model has significant implications for EU 
institutions and policies with, for example, less emphasis to be placed on vocational education and more on third level; more 
stress on channelling resources to new start-ups rather than on large incumbent firms; more reallocation of scarce labour and 
capital resources across firms and innovation systems rather than within firms; and a movement away from an innovation 
system which was traditionally incremental in nature to one focussed on more fundamental breakthroughs. 
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